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THE MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION PLAN AMENDMENT ACT OF
1980: THE DEFEAT OF EMPLOYER RELIANCE INTERESTS IN
PEICK v. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORA TION.
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amend-
ment Act of 1980 [MPPAA] to reform a major portion of the pri-
vate pension system.1 The private sector has vigorously opposed its
implementation.2 Employers, who in the past negotiated to con-
tribute to independent pension trusts, now find to their dismay
that they cannot negotiate out of those same plans without incur-
ring ruinous withdrawal liabilities.3 In case after case and into ap-
peal, withdrawing employers affected by the legislation are arguing
that MPPAA imposes unforeseen and unconstitutional liabilities
upon them.4 The stakes are immense: an estimated thirty-three to
1. Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat.
832 (1980) [MPPAA]. The MPPAA amended the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 832 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)) [ERISA]. In this Note, unless otherwise indicated, references to ERISA
refer to the pre-1980 law, absent the MPPAA amendments; MPPAA refers to post-1980
ERISA with the MPPAA amendments.
2. The Pension Benefit Gurantee Corporation [PBGC] counted 134 cases attacking the
constitutionality of MPPAA on March 10, 1983. See Hertz, Recent Developments Under
the Multi-Employer [sic] Pension Plan Amendment Act of 1980, N.Y. ST. B.A. LAB. & EMP.
L. NEWSLETTER, Summer 1983, at 4.
3. An employer "withdraws" from a pension plan when he ceases to have any obligation
to contribute to it. Reasons for withdrawal include cessation of business (see, e.g., Coronet
Dodge Inc. v. Speckman, 553 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Mo. 1982), appeal docketed, No. 82-2554
(8th Cir.)), decertification of the sponsoring bargain unit (see, e.g., Pacific Iron & Metal Co.
v. Western Conf. of Team., 553 F. Supp. 523 (W.D. Wash. 1982)), and reorganization (see,
e.g., Board of Trust. of West. Conf. of Team. v. Ceazan, 559 F. Supp. 1210 (N.D. Cal. 1983)).
"Withdrawal liability" is the amount assessed an employer withdrawing from a plan by
the plan trustees. This liability is determined as a fractional part of the difference between
the plan's assets and the plan's liabilities, i.e. the future promised benefits. The difference is
called the plan's "unfunded vested liability," indicating that funds will be required to meet
future, promised benefits. See passim Note, ERISA's Title IV and the Multiemployer Pen-
sion Plan, 1979 DuKE L.J. 644.
4. For a current listing of cases challenging the constitutionality of the MPPAA, see
Shelter Framing Corp. v. PBGC, 705 F.2d 1502, 1504 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983), af'g Shelter Fram-
ing Corp. v. Carpenters Pension Trust, 543 F. Supp. 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1982); see also NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 1, 1982, at 50, col. 3. To date, four federal circuit courts of appeal have decided
cases around MPPAA's constitutionality. The Ninth Circuit held MPPAA's retroactive ap-
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fifty-eight billion dollars has been shifted from private pension
plan ledgers onto employer financial sheets, and has consequently
affected the course of business beyond the accountants' books.' Be-
cause of the prosecution of constitutional challenges to MPPAA in
the courts,7 it is unclear whether the legislation will survive intact.
At least one federal circuit court of appeals has recently declared
.that MPPAA is unconstitutional as retroactively applied."
The most comprehensive opinion to date has upheld MPPAA
in its entirety. In Peick v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation,"
an action for declaratory judgment, federal district court Judge
Getzendanner upheld the constitutionality of the MPPAA as ap-
plied both prospectively and retrospectively. In a thorough discus-
sion of the legislative and litigious background of MPPAA, Judge
Getzendanner stated: "Congress has most probably gone to the
very limits of its constitutional powers. Nevertheless, I cannot say
that it went too far."10 The court ruled that the employer plaintiffs
plication unconstitutional in Shelter Framing; the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutional-
ity of MPPAA in its entirety in Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council Pension Fund,
718 F.2d 628 (4th Cir. 1983); as did the Second Circuit in Textile Workers Pension Fund v.
Standard Dye & Fin Co., No. 83-7004 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984); and the Seventh Circuit held
that "the withdrawal liability provisions of the MPPAA survive every constitutional scru-
tiny." Peick v. PBGC, No. 82-2081, slip op. at 55 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983).
5. See PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTEE CORPORATION, MULTIEMPLOYER STUDY REQUIRED BY
PuB. L. No. 95-214, at 151, table 1 (1978) [PBGC STUDY].
6. Cases where employers have been billed for withdrawal liability in excess of their
net worth have drawn publicity. See, e.g., Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1982, at 40, col. 1. Some
employers have chosen to "consume" their assets rather than pay off withdrawal liability.
Id.
7. See supra note 2. The PBGC has admitted that it is hard pressed to defend MP-
PAA constitutionality in the numerous cases challenging it nationwide. Shelter Framing,
705 F.2d at 1508.
8. Id. Shelter Framing concerned two contractors in the construction business. Both
employers contributed to a union pension trust until collective bargaining negotiations
reached an impasse in August, 1980. Each employer was then assessed his computed portion
of the trust's unfunded vested liability (180 percent of the net worth of the first employer,
40 percent of the second). The Ninth Circuit held that "retroactive application of [MPPAAJ
violated the employer's rights to due process as guaranteed by the fifth amendment." Id. at
1515.
9. 539 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ill. 1982), af'd, No. 82-2081 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983). The
Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court "in all respects." Peick, No. 82-2081, slip op. at 2
(7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983). The district court opinion remains the most comprehensive discus-
sion to date of MPPAA constitutionality. All citations herein are to the district court opin-
ion unless otherwise noted.
10. 539 F. Supp. at 1056. Judge Getzendanner was referring to the retrospective aspects
of MPPAA, which imposed liability on employers withdrawing from plans prior to MPPAA
enactment. See infra notes 123-45 and accompanying text.
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would be held liable should they attempt to withdraw from the
pension plan into which they had bargained."'
This note focuses on the due process problems raised by the
Employee Retirement Income Security act of 1974 [ERISA] 12 as
amended by MPPAA and addressed in Peick. This note concludes
that (1) ERISA imposed substantial and unexpected obligations on
multiemployer plan contributors who previously, and in many
cases legitimately, relied on contractual disclaimers of plan liabil-
ity; (2) the Peick court used an improper analysis in sustaining the
congressional right to effect such contractual disruptions; and (3)
the Peick court employed improper legal justifications to uphold
the retroactive MPPAA date of effective liability. In an ancillary
section, this note will discuss the legal avenues available to em-
ployers to restrain expansion of a fund's unfunded vested liability
by trustees in the light of recent MPPAA litigation.
I. MPPAA IN CONTEXT
A. The Legislative Background
The Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 [Taft-Hart-
ley]13 provided a general and flexible framework for pension plans,
and fostered a favorable climate for the establishment of such
plans by offering tax incentives to contributing employers. 4 Con-
gress carefully balanced the responsibilities and obligations of the
three parties to the plans: employers, unions, and employees.'
Both management and union trustees administered the plans, and
strict fiduciary standards measured their performance." Pension
11. 539 F. Supp. at 1062.
12. See supra note 1.
13. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ch. 120, § 302(c), 61 Stat. 136 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141, 186(c) (1976)).
14. See passim, PBGC STUDY, supra note 5. Nearly eight million individuals now par-
ticipate in approximately two thousand private multiemployer pension plans. Id. at 20.
15. The purpose of Taft-Hartley was to avoid industrial strife, which would be mini-
mized "if employers, employees and labor organizations each recognize under law one an-
other's legitimate rights in their relations with each other. Taft-Hartley § 1, 29 U.S.C.
§ 141(b) (1976).
16. Taft-Hartley, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) states:
The provisions of this section shall not be applicable with respect to money or
other thing paid to a trust fund established ... for the sole and exclusive benefit
of the employees of such employer, and. . . the detailed basis on which such
payments are to be made is specified in a written agreement with the employer,
and employees and employers are equally represented in the administration of
1983]
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plans are today regarded as a mandatory bargaining point. 17 By
the mid-1960's, the proliferation of private plans and increased
employee reliance upon them as a source of retirement income gen-
erated political interest in their regulation."' Congress enacted
ERISA to protect the beneficiaries of these pension plans by insur-
ing that the pension benefits would be available at their retire-
ment.19 ERISA imposed minimum levels on pension funding, stan-
dardized employee benefit vesting levels, and created an insurance
system to ameliorate the impact of plan terminations. 20 The insur-
ance system was implemented by the legislative creation of the
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation [PBGC]. 2" The PBGC was
chartered to use its funds to fill any shortfall in fund assets at a
plan's termination,22 and was provided a cause of action against
any employer which failed to provide the contributions required to
fulfill its contributory obligations.23
Multiemployer plans, generally greater in scope than single
employer plans, were insured under ERISA only at the discretion
of the PBGC, and, as with single employer plans, maximum em-
ployer liability was limited to 30 percent of net worth.24 Also, an
such fund....
The courts have recognized the importance of insulating pension plans and their financial
concerns from the interests of employers and unions. See, e.g., Turner v. Local U. No. 302,
Int'l Broth. of Team., 604 F.2d 1219, 1227 (3d Cir. 1979) ("The dominant purpose of § 302 is
to prevent employers from tampering with the loyalty of union officials and to prevent
union officials from extorting tribute from employers.").
17. Courts have recognized the bargaining unit's right to strike for pension funding. See
Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949) (citing
with approval Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)).
18. Hearings on Private Pension Plans before the Subcommitttee on Fiscal Policy of
the Joint Economic Committee, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1267-68 (1966) (testimony of W.
Solenburger, Ass't Dir., Dep't of Soc. Security, Int'l Union United Auto., Aerospace, &
Agric. Implement Workers).
19. The initial impetus for political investigation of the private pension system was the
closing of the South Bend, Indiana Studebaker plant in 1963, where 4500 workers lost 85
percent of their vested benefits because the plan had insufficient assets to cover its liabili-
ties. 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY of ERISA 1597-1600 (1975).
20. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1053 (vesting standards), 1081 (funding standards), 1302 (plan
termination insurance) (1976).
21. Id. § 1302.
22. Id. §§ 1321-1322.
23. Id. §§ 1303(e), 1368.
24. Id. § 1362(b) (maximum liability); id. § 1381(c)(2) (PBGC discretion to insure mul-
tiemployer plans). Mandatory guarantees were to become effective for multiemployer plans
on Jan. 1, 1978. ERISA, § 1381(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. at § 1381(c)(4) (1976). This date was subse-
quently pushed back a number of times, and was finalized at August 1, 1980. Peick, 539 F.
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employer who withdrew from a multiemployer plan was liable for a
share of the unfunded vested liability only if the plan terminated
within five years of its withdrawal. 25 Therefore, liability was both
limited and contingent.
Concern was expressed that some ERISA provisions actually
encouraged employer withdrawal from multiemployer plans. 26 The
PBGC stated in a 1978 study that the ERISA legislation had ag-
gravated the multiemployer plan situation:
ERISA generally, and termination insurance in particular, may very well con-
tribute to the [employer withdrawal problems]. For example, high guarantees,
such as under the current statute, and limited employer liability may make
termination an attractive alternative to continuation where the cost of main-
taining the plan on an ongoing basis becomes too high .... Other ERISA
rules may also be a factor contributing to plan termination. The current with-
drawal rules may discourage large employers from entering multiemployer
plans, thus weakening the contribution base. In addition, the restrictions on
benefit reductions contained in ERISA limit the flexibility such plans previ-
ously had to avoid termination because of financial distress.
27
Congress acted to shore up the multiemployer pension plan system
by passing MPPAA, which was signed into law on September 26,
1980. In response to the concern that some employers might escape
from their plans in anticipation of MPPAA, Congress made the
new law retroactive to April 29, 1980.2" MPPAA deleted the con-
tingent and limited aspect of employer liability for multiemployer
plan contributors, and required pension plan trustees to calculate
and collect an employer's share of the unfunded vested liability
immediately upon its withdrawal.2"
Supp. at 1030-33.
25. 29 U.S.C. § 1381(c)(2)(A) (1976).
26. "There has been a growing realization among those in the pension community that
the current termination insurance provisions do not foster the survival of multiemployer
plans, and may actually contribute to their decline by encouraging employer withdrawals
and plan terminations." Hearings on the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Act of
1979, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 361 (1980) (testimony of R. Marshall, Sect'y of Labor, and Chmn.
of Bd., PBGO) [Multiemployer Hearings].
27. PBGC STUDY, supra note 2, at 4.
28. MPPAA § 108(c)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1461(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
29. MPPAA § 104(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1399(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
1983] 287
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B. ERISA Shifted Plan Liabilities to Contributing Employers by
Redefining "Defined Contribution Plans" as "Defined Benefit
Plans"
Employers entering Taft-Hartley pension plans agreed to
make contributions to a plan, but typically disclaimed any respon-
sibility for plan administration, performance, and payments.3 0 The
plan thereupon assumed sole responsibility for the ultimate pay-
out of pension benefits. An example of just such a disclaimer was
at issue in Nachman v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation:31
Benefits provided for herein shall be only such benefits as can be provided by
the assets of the Fund. In the event of termination of the Plan, there shall be
no liability or obligation on the part of the Company to make any further
contribution to the Trustee except such contributions, if any, as on the effec-
tive date of such termination, may then be accrued but unpaid.2
Nachman involved a single employer plan. The employer estab-
lished the plan in 1960 pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the UAW, and made regular contributions until Decem-
ber 31, 1975, when the plant closed.3 3 The employer brought an
action in the federal district court seeking a declaratory judgment
that ERISA could impose no withdrawal liability upon it. The dis-
trict court granted summary judgment to the employer. The PBGC
appealed and the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the company
liable and sustaining the constitutionality of ERISA. The Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court decision, though only on narrow,
statutory grounds. The Court did not consider the constitutional
argument.34
30. The collective bargaining agreement creates the multiemployer pension plan, which
is in the form of a trust and thus administered. See PBGC STUDY, supra note 5, at 2. The
PBGC recognized that, prior to ERISA, the collective bargaining agreement establishing the
trust plan also typically defined the employer's obligation to it. Id. at 2-3.
31. 592 F.2d 947 (7th Cir.), aff'd on statutory grounds, 446 U.S. 359 (1979), reh'g de-
nied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980). Nachman is the only ERISA or MPPAA case to date to reach the
Supreme Court, and so it is considerably relied upon in Peick (despite the affirmation in the
Supreme Court on grounds other than constitutionality). The Supreme Court decision was
on a 5-4 vote.
32. 592 F.2d at 950.
33. The Nachman single employer pension plan terminated with fund assets sufficient
to cover only 35 percent of the accrued vested benefits. Id.
34. The Supreme Court held that the employee's pension benefit rights vested in a
contractual sense with the pension plan, 446 U.S. at 365, and that the employer's contrac-
tual disclaimer with the pension plan failed to make the benefits forfeitable, id. at 359. The
PBGC insures only "nonforfeitable" benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). It
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The PBGC argued in Nachman that the typical contractual
disclaimers would not circumvent the legislative reordering of pen-
sion plans under ERISA.3 5 ERISA statutory language recognizes
only two types of plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) states:
The term 'individual account plan' or 'defined contribution plan' means a
pension plan which provides for an individual account for each participant
and for benefits based solely upon the amount contributed to the partici-
pant's account, and any income, expenses, gains and losses, and any forfeit-
ures of accounts of other participants that may be allocated to such partici-
pant's account.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(35) provides: "The term 'defined benefit plan'
means a pension plan other than an individual account plan...."
Prior to ERISA, distinctions between the two types of plans
had been based on the nature of the employer's agreement: where
the employer promised to pay benefits to the employees at retire-
ment, there was a "defined benefits plan;" where it promised con-
tributions to a fund which independently promised benefits, there
was a "defined contribution plan. '3 6  The minority report on
is important to note that this vesting occurred vis-a-vis the pension plan, not the employer,
as the dissent in Nachman pointed out. 446 U.S. at 391-92 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (noting a
"world of difference" between the two relationships at issue).
One author clarified the relationship thus:
In a basic contradiction to the pure legal concept of vesting, the benefit under a
pension plan that is described as vested is, in the usual case. . . contingent...
upon survival... [and] upon the availability of assets in the plan. In principle,
however, this is no different from some other types of vested property rights
such as those embodied in bonds and promissory notes that may not be honored
at maturity because of the financial condition of the promisor. In essence, there-
fore, the vesting of a pension benefit simply means that the realization of the
benefit is no longer contingent upon the individual's remaining in the service of
the employer to normal retirement age.
D. McGILL, PRESERVATION OF PENSION BENEFIT RIGHTS 6 (1972). The survival of a single
employer pension plan with sufficient assets to pay out benefits promised by the plan itself
accordingly depends upon the survival of the employer.
35. The circuit court observed "it may seem illogical to conclude that the Nachman
plan provides employees with nonforfeitable benefits when a clause in the plan expressly
precludes recovery from the employer ... ." 592 F.2d at 953.
36. The traditional definitions of "defined benefit" and "defined contribution" plans
were published in a 1969 glossary of pension plan terms for internal use by the U.S. Dep't of
Labor:
Defined Benefit Plan. A pension plan which provides a definite schedule of
benefits. The employer's contributions under such a plan are determined actua-
rially on a basis of the benefits expected to become payable. Also called "fixed
benefit plan."
Defined Contribution Plan. A pension plan under which the employer's con-
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ERISA recognized, and deplored, the legislative intent to redefine
the terms; therefore, the expansive PBGC interpretation was antic-
ipated.3 7 An attempt to define multiemployer plans as "individual
account plans" within the 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34) definition also
failed."8
C. Facial Constitutional Challenges to MPPAA: Peick v. Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation
While the Seventh Circuit did reach and uphold the constitu-
tionality of ERISA against due process challenges in Nachman, the
Supreme Court did not certify the question. Subsequent lower
tributions are fixed, e.g., a fixed amount for each hour worked or a fixed percent-
age of compensation. Two types are money purchase plans and collectively bar-
gained multi-employer [sic] plans.
OFFICE OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT AND PENSION REPORTS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, GLOSSARY -
CORRESPONDENCE COURSE ON PENSION PLANS (1969), reprinted in W. Jett, Employer Contin-
gent Liabilities Under Union Pension Plans, 27 LAB. L.J. 361, 362-63 (1976).
37. Several minority members of the House Committee on Education and Labor pub-
lished their view that ignoring the traditional distinction between defined benefit and de-
fined contribution plans was unsound policy: "Title IV [plan termination provisions] raises
a serious constitutional question as to whether by legislation we can change the contract of
the employer from a promise to make certain contributions to a fund, to a promise to pay
the pension supported by a pledge of the employer's assets." S. REP. No. 383, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. at 354 (1974). In his dissent in Nachman, J. Powell wrote that the ERISA language
was ambiguous enough that the employer ought not to be held liable. 446 U.S. at 397 ("[Iun
the absence of a clear expression of congressional intent, I would not conclude that Congress
meant to alter contractual arrangements between private parties.").
Employers were for the most part caught by surprise at the redefinition of "defined con-
tribution plans" brought about by the new definition in ERISA. One employer testified at
the MPPAA congressional hearings thus:
Multiemployer pension funds, as I have described this one, are clearly defined
contribution plans. It was incorrect of whoever was responsible for so doing, to
include these funds in the category of defined benefit plans. We in the industry
were asleep at the switch when we permitted this to happen without disputing it.
We simply had no idea of the repercussions that would ensue today as a result of
this declassification.
Multiemployer Hearings, supra note 26, at 460 (testimony of M. Cahill, Pres., Duncan &
Cahill, Inc.)
38. Connolly v. PBGC, 581 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 935 (1979).
The Ninth Circuit could not reconcile 29 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1976) with plaintiff's argu-
ment against including the typical multiemployer plan in ERISA's coverage. 29 U.S.C. §
1321(c)(1) states: "[T]he term 'individual account plan' does not include a plan under which
a fixed benefit is promised if the employer or his representitive participated in the determi-
nation of that benefit." The court held the employer appointed trustees to be the employer's
"representative." 581 F.2d at 734. The Connolly court specifically declined to reach the is-
sue of ERISA constitutionality. Id.
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court holdings have interpreted the Supreme Court's failure to cer-
tify the constitutional question as approval sub silentio.39 Nach-
man is the only ERISA case to date to come before the Supreme
Court, and the narrow holding was on a 5-4 vote.
In the absence of a definitive Supreme Court approval of the
constitutionality of the entire private pension regulatory system,
challenges to MPPAA continue. The plaintiffs in Peick were em-
ployers contributing to the Local 705 International Brotherhood of
Teamsters Pension Fund.40 They were joined in the suit for declar-
atory relief by the trustees of the plan.41 The employers contended
that MPPAA was unconstitutional because it imposed unbar-
gained-for liabilities upon them as contributors, and because it im-
posed new, extensive responsibilities upon the pension plan trust-
ees.42 The plaintiffs argued that they were being deprived of their
property without due process of law. They further contended that
the "duties and obligations imposed upon them are arbitrarily
more onerous than those imposed upon their single employer coun-
terparts by ERISA.
' 43
In upholding the constitutionality of the MPPAA, Judge
Getzendanner substantially adopted the analysis employed by the
Seventh Circuit in Nachman.44 That analysis focused principally
39. See discussion at Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1040, and cases cited therein.
40. The pension plan fund involved in Peick is one of the largest in the nation, serving
roughly 20,000 participants. Over 600 employers withdrew and 100 joined the fund in the
five years preceding the suit. Id. at 1034.
41. The court dismissed at the outset arguments that there existed no Article III "case
or controversy." The court ruled that the adverse effect of perceived withdrawal liability on
employer balance sheets and consequent impairment of credit access gave plaintiff employ-
ers sufficient standing. Further, administrative exhaustion was held unnecessary because the
suit was a facial, constitutional challenge to the MPPAA, not a challenge to the act as ap-
plied. Id. at 1035-38; accord, Republic Indus. v. Central Pa. Team., 693 F.2d 290 (3d Cir.
1982); Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 635 (4th Cir.
1983).
42. While recognizing the cause of action for plaintiff trustees, the court concentrated
on the plaintiff employers claims as embracing those of the trustees. 539 F. Supp. at 1038
n.28.
43. Id. at 1035. While this Note agrees with the equal protection arguments of plain-
tiffs, the issue is treated below as part of the due process discussion relating to comparisons
between ERISA and MPPAA statutory approaches.
44. The Nachman test of constitutionality considered: (1) the reliance interests of the
parties affected; (2) whether the impairment of the private interests occurred in an area
previously subject to regulatory control; (3) the equities of the burdens imposed; and (4) the
provisions to limit and moderate the impact of the burdens. 592 F.2d at 960. The "Nachman
Analysis" has become the standard for constitutional challenges to MPPAA. See, e.g., Shel-
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on the reliance and notice issues raised by ERISA; those issues are
also at the vortex of the storm surrounding MPPAA.
II. THE RELIANCE INTERESTS AFFECTED By MPPAA
The history of ERISA litigation frequently involves discus-
sions of "who promised what to whom" under the Taft-Hartley
guidelines. Relying on their contractual disclaimers and the lan-
guage of the collective bargaining agreements, the employers have
argued that their liability stopped at contributions; only the plan
promised benefits to the employees. The Peick opinion found such
arguments deceptive, at least with regard to single employer plans:
"In relying upon its liability disclaimer clause, Nachman had re-
lied upon nothing more than an asserted right to break the 'true'
deal it had struck with its employees."45
A fundamental distinction may, however, be drawn between a
Nachman type of single employer plan, where all plan contribu-
tions necessarily cease when the employer withdraws, and a Peick
type of multiemployer plan where continuity is not necessarily
threatened by one employer's withdrawal. 46 The single employer
ter Framing, 705 F.2d at 1510-11.
This analysis fails to consider the traditional tests of public purpose, necessity and rea-
sonability. See infra notes 71-87 and accompanying text. Peick considers the true test to be
one of "rationality." See infra note 67.
45. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1043.
46. The Peick opinion states:
The same conclusions cannot be drawn in the multiemployer field. Here, the
promise to pay benefits runs not from one employer, but from a trust financed
by an entire group of firms acting collectively. It follows that the withdrawal of a
single employer does not automatically lead to a breach of the payment duty.
For even when the plan lacks sufficient assets to pay all claims which have
vested as of the date of withdrawal, the employers that remain may pick up the
slack to such an extent that the harm caused by the withdrawal substantially
abates. An employer that relies upon a liability disclaimer clause contained in a
multiemployer plan is therefore not relying upon an asserted right to frustrate
employee expectations at will. The employer's reliance is in this sense more rea-
sonable than anything present in Nachman.
Id. at 1044 (emphasis added).
Multiemployer plans were designed so that remaining employers would cover the liabili-
ties left behind by withdrawing employers. PBGC STUDY, supra note 5, at 3. Indeed, mul-
tiemployer plans were, as a group, quite stable before ERISA. The PBGC Study noted:
Before passage of ERISA, terminations of multiemployer plans were extremely
rare. The low incidence of such terminations was due primarily to two factors.
First, participation in multiemployer plans and the industries covered by those
plans generally continued to grow through the 1960's. Second, in those cases in
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plan is a more symbiotic relationship because there is only one em-
ployer involved and all beneficiaries are its former employees. The
promises of the plan are more easily traced to the employer. A
multiemployer plan, on the other hand, involves the common effort
of a number of employers, any one of whose promise to its employ-
ees is lost among the whole." Multiemployer plans were devised
for employee flexibility as well; indeed, it is a crucial arrangement
for the construction industry, for example, where an employee
might work for a number of employers within one season.48 Pre-
ERISA courts were careful to look at all of the circumstances of a
plan before tracing liability benefits back to an employer.
A. Legitimate Employee Claims of Employer-Based Pension Re-
liance Were Upheld in Pre-ERISA Litigation
Taft-Hartley provided a general framework for pension plan
development.49 The courts, applying common law concepts of eq-
uity, scrutinized plan administration by traditional fiduciary stan-
dards. The courts also measured the extent of the bargain from
both sides of the table, and then compared the employee's percep-
tion of the bargain.5 0 Thus, pre-ERISA caselaw established that
which the industry declined and the plan contribution base shrank, causing
financial difficulties, the plans were able to reduce benefits to avoid termination.
ERISA restricts some of the actions that plans previously took to avert termina-
tion but does not provide effective substitutes.
Id.
47. It is the common bond of the union, which acts through collective bargaining with a
number of employers to establish the plan, that makes the multiemployer plan attractive.
An employee can accumulate "credits" while working for a number of different firms. See
Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council Pension Fund, 718 F.2d at 632 n.1.
48. See PBGC STUDY, supra note 5, at 3.
49. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
50. The differing perceptions of employee pension rights was apparent during congres-
sional hearings prior to enactment of MPPAA.
MS. FERGUSON: Again, approaching it from the employee's point of view - I
certainly heard from a number of employees pre-ERISA as well as post-
ERISA - they always assume that the pension was there.
MR. ERLENBORN: I am not talking about the perception. I am talking about
the reality.
MS. FERGUSON: The reality, there is a question!
MR. ERLENBORN: There was a risk taken by the employee, was there not?
MS. FERGUSON: But the employee was not aware of the risk, and that is one
of the problems.
MR. ERLENBORN: Again, you are talking about perception. I am speaking of
reality.
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when employees labored under the impression that compensation
included future employer-sponsored pension benefits, courts of eq-
uity would brush aside legal disclaimers of liability. Two pre-
ERISA cases demonstrate this approach.
In Hurd v. Hutnick,51 the federal district court held employers
accountable for the promises made by their appointed trustees. A
multiemployer plan was on the verge of termination by the mutual
consent of both the employer and union trustees.5 2 The court, in
considering diverse problems involved with the termination, dis-
covered that the plan lacked sufficient assets to endure more than
a few years. Termination would therefore have inflicted grievous
consequences on retirees who relied on the pension benefits for
which they had worked. No trustee represented the interests of the
beneficiaries, fiduciary standards notwithstanding. The court
thereupon took a strong stand in equity to protect the retirees, and
denied the validity of the employers' asserted contractual
disclaimers.
Though the legal framework of the fund and its relationship to the collective
bargaining parties were purportedly constructed to prevent the assumption of
responsibility by the employers for the representations made to the employ-
ees, a court of equity will not permit the reasonable and justified expectations
of those employees, knowingly wielded by the employers for whom they la-
bored for so many years, to be frustrated in this manner.
5 3
The court acted upon the doctrine of promissory estoppel in
denying the contributing employers the right to terminate the plan
under these circumstances. The court-accepted definition of prom-
MS. FERGUSON: This is one of the reasons that ERISA was enacted, because
once that surfaced in the public view, that was deemed to be unacceptable
and inappropriate.
Multiemployer Hearings, supra note 26, at 431 (dialogue between M. Ferguson, Dir. of Pen-
sion Rights Ctr., and Rep. John Erlenborn).
51. 419 F. Supp. 630 (D.N.J. 1976).
52. Id. at 655. The original suit was brought by active employees who complained that
the plan was paying benefits to retirees whose former employers were no longer contributing
to the plan. Id. at 633 n.1. It became clear that the legal interests of the plaintiffs were not
jeopardized by the proposed plan termination. Id. at 636 n.1. The court also found that
dismissal of the action would work to the great detriment of the retired beneficiaries, who
had no counsel guarding their interests. Id. Counsel was then appointed for the retirees,
whom the union could not represent. Id.
53. Id. at 655. Though not referred to as such, the Fourth Circuit discussed the applica-
tion of the doctrine in Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council Pension Fund, 718 F.2d
at 639.("[E]mployees... provided their services on the actual or implied promise that they
would ultimately enjoy their vested, accrued pension benefits.").
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issory estoppel stated:
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action of
forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the prom-
isee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if justice can
be avoided only by enforcement of the promise."'
In Hurd, the court held that no contractual disclaimer was ever
effectively communicated by the employers to the employees, that
the employees labored under the impression that they were being
compensated in part by future benefits, and that the employers
were thus estopped from pleading that there was no enforceable
promise of benefits. 5
The Hurd court found that a contractual disclaimer had in-
deed been published by at least one employer defendant, but held
representations made by the employer-appointed trustees resulted
in liability: the pension plan administrators published pamphlets
which were a major source of information to the employees con-
cerning their compensation out of the collective bargaining, and
the pamphlets in no part advised the employees that their benefits
were contingent on the existence of sufficient assets in the plan to
satisfy future benefits. 6
54. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS, § 90, quoted in Hurd, 419 F. Supp. at 656. Testimony
of both employer and employee trustees indicated that the retirees relied upon the benefit
promised by the fund, and that plan termination would affect that reliance drastically. The
union briefly protested that the retiree benefits should be protected in the event of termina-
tion of the fund.
THE COURT: What did [the union] tell you?
THE WITNESS: They weren't going to sell their old people down the river. It
was an economic necessity, they finally realized. There wasn't much more
money available [to keep the plan going] ....
THE COURT: They wouldn't sell their old people down the river?
THE WITNESS: In so many words, yes.
THE COURT: How long did the strike last?
THE WITNESS: I think it lasted only about one day.
THE COURT: What was the result of that strike?
THE WITNESS: The Union agreed that they would waive - agree to our pro-
posal to terminate the old pension plan....
THE COURT: So the present employees got a wage increase and the past em-
ployees no more contributions on their behalf? Is that it?
THE WITNESS: In fact, that is what happened, yes.
Hurd, 419 F. Supp. at 650.
55. The multiemployer plan involved in Hurd terminated soon after the case. The
PBGC, under its discretionary authority, chose to insure the benefits. See PBGC STUDY,
supra note 5, app. XV, 1-3.
56. Under persistent questioning by a doubtful court, an employer trustee denied that
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Courts invoked promissory estoppel where they found em-
ployees rendered consideration in terms of productivity and loyalty
in return for the perceived promise of pension benefits. But where
an employer's trustees emphasized to employees that future bene-
fits were contingent on the existence of sufficient assets in the
plan, the courts held that promissory estoppel was inappropriate.
In Boase v. Lee Rubber and Tire Corp.,57 the Third Circuit noted
that the employer had stated in clear language that employee ben-
efits depended on fund assets.
[A]t the time the plan was announced, the employees were advised: "While
the company confidently expects to continue the necessary payments in the
future, it must however reserve the right to change or even discontinue the
plan if future conditions should necessitate such action." Similar caveats pe-
riodically were brought to the employees attention. Employees were specifi-
cally admonished that their rights and benefits were governed by the plan
itself, copies of which were always available to eligible employees.' 8
The court concluded that the employees "ceased to possess any en-
forceable rights against Lee once the company elected to put into
effect the amending and terminating conditions expressly set forth
in the instrument.
5 9
Legal considerations aside, there was reason for employers to
want the employees to understand that it was contributions that
were promised and not benefits: recognition would follow that the
prosperity of the plan depended on the prosperity of the em-
ployer.6 0 However, there is another side to the issue: benefits are
more easily bargained away at the negotiating table when the fiscal
crunch will come thirty or forty years down the road. The distant
horizons of pension benefits concerned those who legislated
MPPAA.6 1
he had any knowledge of what was contained in the pamphlets which the plan had pub-
lished informing the employees of their pension rights. 419 F.Supp. at 652.
57. 437 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1971).
58. Id. at 533 n.15.
59. Id. at 533.
60. In Hoefel v. Atlas Tack Corp., 581 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), the employer made a
pledge of retirement benefits under an arrangement where he purchased an annuity for each
retiring employee. The employer subsequently entered a Taft-Hartley plan to provide the
same benefits at considerably less expense. Id. at 3. The "benefits came to depend.., upon
the continuance of the plan and on Atlas' continued solvency." Id. The original promise of
benefits, rather than the later promise only of contributions, was held to be binding.
61. "One [benefit] would be to cause greater realism in the bargaining process.. . . [1]f
you can defer something into the indefinite future, then you are likely to be able to make a
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The cases show that on the eve of ERISA, the employees could
not be said to have relied invariably on perceived promises of fu-
ture benefits from the employers. Certainly, where the issue was
unclear or good faith administration was absent, the courts acted
to assure benefits, and at times pursued equity outside the scope of
the original action. But where the employer had acted in good faith
to inform his employees of the true nature of their future benefits,
courts upheld the validity of the contractual disclaimer; to do oth-
erwise would have been to give the employees something they
clearly had not won at the bargaining table. Judge Getzendanner's
strong condemnation in Peick of the employer's liability disclaimer
argument in Nachman, declaring that the employer "had relied
upon nothing more than an asserted right to break the 'true' deal
it had struck with its employees," 62 was a distortion of the pre-
ERISA situation.
B. MPPAA Destroyed Legitimate Employer Reliances
If the typical liability disclaimer was legally sufficient to dispel
employee reliance on employer promises of benefits, it would also
have been sufficient to assure the employer that his liability termi-
nated with his contribution. MPPAA served to destroy that reli-
ance in two ways. First, the statutory elimination of the contrac-
tual disclaimer unsettled cost expectations that employers took
away from the collective bargaining table. And second, more oner-
ously, MPPAA's retroactive application imposed unforeseeable lia-
bility on employers who withdrew from multiemployer plans while
less exacting laws governed.
1. MPPAA Disrupted the Contractual Expectations of Mul-
tiemployer Plan Contributing Employers. Employers seek to carry
away from the bargaining table as precise an idea of their future
labor costs as possible. Labor costs include both straight-time
wages and fringe benefits, the latter increasingly including em-
ployer contributions to pension plans. When pension plan contri-
butions alone are negotiated, the employer is able to make a
quick agreement in order to make that deferral and therefore concentrate on things which
are now much more urgent." Multiemployer Hearings, supra note 26, at 364 (testimony of
R. Marshall). It must be noted that the plan's trustees, acting on actuarial projections, de-
termined benefit levels.
62. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1043.
1983] 297
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
straight calculation of costs per hour; but when benefits are negoti-
ated, future liabilities depend upon plan asset performance in the
marketplace, something over which the employer has no control.
This difference is crucial in the ledger books because it affects the
appearance of the employer's net worth. It was for this reason,
among others, that the employers in Peick were granted standing. 3
a) The "Public Purpose" standard and MPPAA contractual
disruption. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, a case frequently cited in
MPPAA litigation, the Supreme Court recognized "that legislation
readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it up-
sets otherwise settled expectations. 6 4 The Court sustained a con-
gressional act granting new benefits (both federally and privately
funded) to retired miners suffering from pneumoconiosis05 The
Court held that the miners were entitled to the additional compen-
sation for the hidden injuries they had suffered at the time of the
employment. The determination of liability after the fact to the
private parties involved was justified as a means of distributing
hidden costs to those who had profited from the miners' labor.6 0
Aside from the no-longer infrequent discovery of employment
related disease and governmental attempts to set things right, the
Court insisted upon a higher standard for economic readjustments
involving employer payment of unbargained-for compensation.
The Supreme Court addressed the right of an employer to calcu-
late his annual costs and bargain for them at the negotiating table
in Allied Steel v. Spannaus0 7 The case involved a Minnesota em-
63. Id. at 1036.
64. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
65. Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 792,
as amended by The Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 163
(current version at 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
66. Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 18.
67. 438 U.S. 234 (1978). Plaintiffs in Allied Steel relied primarily on the contract clause
of the United States Constitution, which states: "No state shall. . . pass any Bill of Attain.
der, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts. . . ." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 10. While refusing to concede the point that the fifth amendment due process clause has
the same effect as the more explicit contract clause, Judge Getzendanner held that MPPAA
would survive such heightened review in any event. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1040 & n.31,
1041. The Seventh Circuit refused to apply a strict scrutiny contract clause standard on
appeal in Peick. The court found that standard to apply only where a state is itself one of
the contracting parties. Peick, No. 82-2081, slip op. at 41-42 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983).
Other commentators have held that the due process clause could satisfy all contract
clause challenges, with one standard of review for both. "[T]here is at least a tendency for
the Contract Clause and the due process clause to coalesce. . . . [T]he results might be the
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ployer which closed its plant and terminated contributions to the
employee pension plan. The state had passed a law vesting pension
rights after a statutory ten year term of employment, but the em-
ployer's plan vested after fifteen years."" The Court held the state's
pension plan regulation to be unconstitutional, finding the issue of
employee compensation had been settled at the bargaining table.
The company's maximum obligation was to set aside each year an amount
based on the plan's requirements for vesting. . . . And, of course, the com-
pany was free to amend or terminate the pension plan at any time. The com-
pany thus had no reason to anticipate that its employees' pension rights
could become vested except in accordance with the terms of the plan. It re-
lied heavily, and reasonably, on this legitimate contractual expectation in cal-
culating its annual contributions to the pension fund. 9
In Allied Steel the Court relied in part on the standard for review
that it had enunciated in United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey.70
In that case, where the Court held that the Contract Clause71 was
violated by the state's unilateral alteration of a contractual obliga-
tion to which it was a party, the Court stated that "legislation ad-
justing the rights and responsibilities of contracting parties must
be upon reasonable conditions and of a character appropriate to
the public purpose justifying its adoption.
'7 2
The public purpose of the Minnesota law in Allied Steel
proved too narrow to withstand scrutiny.73 Public purpose tests
have defeated previous congressional attempts at pension regula-
tion as well. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton,7 4 congres-
sional legislation establishing an employer-financed pension system
for current and former railway employees was challenged. That
pension system was held to amount to "the imposition of liability
same if the Contract Clause were dropped out of the Constitution, and the challenged stat-
utes all judged as reasonable or unreasonable deprivations of property." R. Hale, The Su-
preme Court and the Contract Clause, 57 HARv. L. REv. 852, 890-91 (1944); accord, Shelter
Framing, 705 F.2d at 1513 n.12; contra Note, supra note 3, at 664 n.129. Clearly, a simple
finding of rationality should not suffice to clear these constitutional hurdles, which is what
Peick at one point states. 539 F. Supp. at 1041; cf. id. at 1056 n.80.
68. The state law had an effective life of only nine months; ERISA preempted the law
on Jan. 1, 1975. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 248 n.21.
69. Id. at 245-46.
70. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
71. See supra note 67.
72. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. at 22.
73. Allied Steel, 438 U.S. at 248-49. The state pension act regulated only those employ-
ers (1) who employed more than 100 employees, and (2) who had joined private plans.
74. 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
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to pay again for services long since rendered and fully compen-
sated."75 The Court in Turner Elkhorn, speaking of the specific
needs addressed by the "black lung legislation," felt compelled to
distinguish the Alton holding:
Assuming that the portion of Alton invalidating this provision retains vital-
ity, we find it distinguishable from this case. The point of the black lung
benefit provisions is not simply to increase or supplement a former em-
ployee's salary to meet his generalized need for funds. Rather, the purpose
of the Act is to satisfy a specific need created by the dangerous conditions
under which the former employee labored - to allocate to the mine operator
an actual, measurable cost of his business.78
In Allied Steel, the state of Minnesota contended that the eco-
nomic welfare of its workers and senior citizens justified the law."
This public purpose did not prevail when the Court balanced it
against the contractual rights ravaged to finance the legislative
scheme.
In discussing the purpose of MPPAA in Peick, Judge
Getzendanner falls short of the public purpose focus. Instead, the
interests of employer and employee are balanced while the na-
tional need for regulation of the private pension system as a whole
is ignored. Peick substantially adopts the tone of Nachman, re-
peating the latter's narrow conclusion that the disruption of the
employer's contractual expectations was "relatively insignificant
compared to the gain in employee security that thereby results. '78
In other words, because the employers can afford it, the distribu-
tion of new employee benefits is somehow justified.
Necessity, mother to many exceptions in the law, shadows the
issue of public purpose. The Court has long respected the inherent
powers of the government to address widespread economic dis-
75. Id. at 335.
76. 428 U.S. at 19 (emphasis added). In Alton, Chief Justice Hughes dissented, joined
by Brandeis, Stone, and Cardozo, on the grounds that the whole of the legislation should
not be invalidated. The careful distinction of Alton by the Court in Turner Elkhorn was
noted by the Ninth Circuit in Shelter Framing, 705 F.2d at 1513, by the Fourth Circuit in
Republic Indus. v. Teamsters Joint Council Pension Fund, 718 F.2d 628, 636 (4th Cir. 1983),
and by the Seventh Circuit in Peick, No. 82-2081, slip op. at 32-33 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983).
77. Appellee's Brief at 13, Allied Steel.
78. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1043. "An employer that relies upon a contractual exemption
from post-withdrawal liability is thus relying upon a right to unleash forces that are poten-
tially destructive of benefit security. The difference between [Peick] and Nachman is not as
great as plaintiffs assert." Id. at 1044.
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tress.79 During the Great Depression, a number of laws which dis-
rupted contractual expectations were sustained. 0 The Minnesota
law in Allied Steel, on the other hand, did not even purport to deal
with a widespread problem."' Plaintiffs in Peick contended that no
important, general economic or social problem existed sufficient to
justify the passage of MPPAA.8 2 A 1978 PBGC study required by
Congress showed that about ten percent of covered multiemployer
plans were experiencing financial difficulties which might result in
plan terminations over the subsequent ten years.' But plaintiffs
pointed to the remarkable stability of all multiemployer plans
prior to the study: only four plans had terminated between ERISA
enactment and the date of the report, and very few before that. 4
The state of multiemployer plans on the eve of MPPAA enactment
was nothing less than stable. 5
Nevertheless, the Peick opinion deferred to the congressional
determination that multiemployer plans were on the verge of deep
financial distress.8 " That conclusion made the amendments to
79.
The cases referred to in Allied Steel, where reorderings of contractual obligations were born
of necessity, occurred during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 438 U.S. at 249 n.24.
80. Id. at 247. The Court recognized a presumption that the legislation was valid, but
noted the lack of support in the record. See infra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. Con-
stitutional challenges to MPPAA remain vulnerable to charges that they argue in the vein of
substantive due process. The Seventh Circuit, affirming in Peick, emphasized its distrust of
that era. Peick, slip op. at 30 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983). See also Coronet Dodge Inc. v.
Speckman, 553 F. Supp. 518, 520 (E.D. Mo. 1982) ("Any other rule [than assumption of
constitutionality] would return the judiciary to the freewheeling days of Lochner v. New
York.") (citation omitted), appeal docketed, No. 82-2554 (8th Cir.).
81. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
82. 539 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
83. PBGC STUDY, supra note 5, at 138. One hundred and sixty multiemployer plans
covering 1,300,000 participants were in danger of termination for financial reasons, accord-
ing to the study. The unfunded vested liabilities that would be assumed (at PBGC discre-
tion) might have amounted to 8.3 billion dollars. Id. at 139.
84. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1042.
85. The Supreme Court commented in Allied Steel that the state had failed to show
any necessity for its law impairing private contractual obligations. "[T]here is no showing in
the record before us that this severe disruption of contractual expectations was necessary to
meet an important general social problem. The presumption favoring 'legislative judgment
as to the necessity and reasonableness of a particular measure' simply cannot stand in this
case." 438 U.S. at 247 (citation omitted). The Peick opinion leaves unanswered the question
of what amount of evidence is required to rebut the flawed study upon which Congress
based its determination that a necessity for the legislation existed. See infra note 88 and
accompanying text.
86. 539 F. Supp. at 1042.
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ERISA necessary: "Congress need not wait for an actual disaster to
strike before attempting a cure. 8 7 The court also noted criticisms
of the study, and observed that Congress was aware of several
flaws in the report; the congressional decision to accept the study
was, to Judge Getzendanner, determinative.8 Therefore, necessity
of legislation counted as a mitigating factor in considering the con-
stitutionality of the contractual impairment.
The Peick court also failed to investigate the possibility of al-
ternatives. When the Taft-Hartley legislation originally established
the framework for pension plan arrangements, it did not make
pension plans mandatory. ERISA could have been established as a
voluntary arrangement, with advantages to employers who volun-
tarily joined or were bargained into the covered plans. Under those
conditions, employees would have conceded immediate compensa-
tion for future benefits.8 " MPPAA awarded employees both, while
the employers have been allocated greater liability.
The Peick opinion falls short of the judicial standard of review
for legislation that disrupts legitimate contractual burdens. How-
ever, Judge Getzendanner found that other circumstances were
present that mitigated the situation and made employer claims of
reliance insubstantial.
b) Peick held that MPPAA-affected employers should have
anticipated additional pension regulation because pension plans
are in a well regulated field. MPPAA imposed strong remedies for
perceived pension plan difficulties caused by employer withdraw-
als.90 Liability was changed from contingent and limited to imme-
87. Id.
88. Id. While legislation must enjoy a presumption of validity, the judiciary has not yet
become the partner of the legislature. The charges that the PBGC study was flawed de-
served a fuller hearing, which Peick denied plaintiffs. See infra note 142.
89. The contractual disclaimer must be viewed as a concession by the union reached
through arms-length bargaining. In Hurd, for example, the union agreed to a lower level of
employer contributions to the fund in return for the deletion of the employer liability dis-
claimer. 419 F. Supp. at 638.
In one case challenging MPPAA constitutionality, employees voluntarily terminated
their associations with their employer and, under a new contract with a related employer,
chose to do without a pension plan and receive higher immediate wages. Notwithstanding
the first employer's argument that the employees demonstrated their non-reliance on future
benefits by their deliberate choice of immediate consideration, the district court imposed
withdrawal liability. Board of Trustees West. Conf. of Team. v. Ceazan, 559 F. Supp. 1210,
1214 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
90. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
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diate and unlimited, and there was no phase-in period for the leg-
islation to take effect, as had been the case with ERISA before it.
Plaintiffs in Peick argued that there was no opportunity to antici-
pate these dramatic changes, especially in light of their retroactiv-
ity.el In considering and rejecting this argument, the district court
acted upon an established rule of constitutional law that the
courts, in the words of Justice Holmes, "by one device or another
have prevented a written constitution from interfering with the
power to make small repairs which a Legislature would naturally
possess. ' '9 2 Legislative repairs in a well regulated field, concluded
Peick, must be expected.9
Judge Getzendanner was critical of plaintiffs because congres-
sional activity on legislative bills of itself must be considered no-
tice to those active in areas which the bills may address. "Reliance
upon existing rights-even those which are reasonable in the ab-
stract-is itself unreasonable when the relying party has notice
that future regulation may alter these rights. ' 94 Therefore, it be-
hooves such parties to anticipate incipient legislation.
When the Supreme Court overturned the Minnesota law
which would have expanded the employer pension liabilities in Al-
lied Steel, one reason it did so was because the employer had no
notice that its collective bargaining agreement would be restruc-
tured by new regulation. The pension law "did not operate in an
area already subject to state regulation."9 5 The Court was con-
cerned about the precipitancy of the law, which gave the employer
little time to accommodate his circumstances to the new situation.
"This legislation [imposed] a sudden, totally unanticipated, and
substantial retroactive obligation upon the company to its employ-
ees. .. ."96
The Peick opinion avoided the issue of the precipitancy of
91. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1044.
92. Danforth v. Groton Water Co., 178 Mass. 472, 477, 59 N.E. 1033, 1034 (1901)
(Holmes, C.J.).
93. The concept of the "well-regulated field" is adopted by Peick from a brief reference
to it by the circuit court in Nachman. 592 F.2d at 960, 962. Some commentators have ac-
cepted the idea without discussion. See, e.g., Note supra note 3, at 671 & n.167. This is not
a "well established doctrine." It was rejected as a separate doctrine by the district court in
Shelter Framing, 543 F. Supp. at 1251, which termed the idea "really just another facet of
reliance." See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
94. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1044.
95. 438 U.S. at 250.
96. Id. at 249.
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MPPAA by noting the previous government regulation of multiem-
ployer plans under ERISA and Taft-Hartley. These acts, and the
consequent regulation, according to Peick were sufficient notice
that Congress meant to be involved in the development of the pri-
vate pension system. 7 However, the opinion identified only a few
tax regulations to show ongoing government concern in the pre-
ERISA period,98 and recognized that most employers, having bar-
gained into the plans in good faith, could utilize their claims of
reliance only at time of withdrawal. 9
Peick refers to an axis of cases around which revolves the pre-
mise that a field, once regulated, is forever subject to legislative
reordering. Upon inspection, however, the principle cases cited are
each better confined to their particular facts than expanded to a
significant constitutional doctrine.
In Norman v. B. & 0. Co., 00 the Supreme Court upheld the
Gold Clause Resolution,°' an important piece of New Deal legisla-
tion which permitted debts to be paid at face value despite cove-
nants for repayment according to the gold content of dollars bor-
rowed. The Court recognized the preeminent power of Congress to
legislate in the legal tender field, holding that "gold clauses" in
private contracts could not take the matter out of congressional
reach.
Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the constitutional authority of the
Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when contracts deal
with a subject matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they have
a congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the
reach of dominant constitutional power by making contracts about them.102
97. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1044-45. The opinion also found the fact of ongoing ERISA
litigation was notict to employers that further regulation of multiemployer plans would be
forthcoming, especially after ERISA was upheld in the Nachman decision. Id. at 1045.
Nachman, of course, involved a single employer plan.
98. Id. The court followed closely the analysis employed by the circuit court in Nach-
man. 592 F.2d at 962 n.33.
99. The Peick decision continually overlooks the fact that multiemployer pension plan
contributing employers, having bargained into a plan, cannot unilaterally withdraw from it
absent further bargaining.
100. 294 U.S. 240 (1934).
101. H.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 48 Stat. 112 (1933) (current version at 31
U.S.C. § 392 (1976)).
102. 294 U.S. at 307-08. Terms like "congenital infirmity," have a way of replacing
analysis and ought to be read carefully. As Lord Coke was wont to caution:
Certainly the fair outsides of enamel'd words and sentences, do sometimes so
bedazzle the eye of the reader's mind with their glittering shew, as they cause
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The Constitution explicitly recognizes the power of Congress to
regulate the currency; 11 3 not so with pensions. The essential and
omnipresent character of federal currency regulations must set
apart the strong language of Norman from the field of MPPAA
litigation.
In another case relied upon by Peick, Congress took action to
clarify a statutory right. In FHA v. The Darlington, Inc.,0 4 plain-
tiff built and rented apartments with the assistance of FHA loans.
Among the regulations in existence at the time plaintiff took out
the loan for this particular project was a requirement that the pro-
ject be for residential housing. Any type of residential housing ap-
parently qualified. 05 Congress subsequently declared that its origi-
nal intent "excludes the use of such housing for transient or hotel
purposes while such insurance on the mortgage remains outstand-
ing." s06 The Court upheld the right of Congress to "buttress" its
regulations: "Those who do business in the regulated field cannot
object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amend-
ments to achieve the legislative end.' 0 7 Certainly, this is the sort
of small repair to which Holmes referred: the modified legislation
was very similar to the original. 0 s
This distinction contrasts with the Peick circumstances. Most
all multiemployer plan contributors entered pension plans relying
on the Taft-Hartley guidelines, which included incentives; 109 the
builder in Darlington relied upon statutory privileges newly pub-
lished and not previously interpreted. Employers entering mul-
tiemployer plans based their legal decisions on the accumulated ju-
them not to see or not to pierce into the inside of the matter; and he that busily
hunteth after affected words, and followeth the strong scent of swelling phrases,
is many times . . . at a dead loss of the matter itself . .. Truth takes small
delight with varnish of words and garnish of flowers.
10 COKE REPORTS pref., ii, reprinted in BOWEN, THE LION AND THE THRONE 506 (1957).
103. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
104. 358 U.S. 84 (1958).
105. National Housing Act Amendments of 1942, ch. 319, § 11, 56 Stat. 303, as
amended by Veterans Emergency Housing Act of 1946, ch. 268, 60 Stat. 214 (current version
at 12 U.S.C. § 1743 (1982)).
106. Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 560, § 132, 68 Stat. 610 (current version at 12
U.S.C. § 1731 (b) (1982)).
107. Darlington, 358 U.S. at 91.
108. See Shelter Framing, 543 F. Supp. at 1251. Courts have seldom ventured far be-
yond the "small repairs" limit. See Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, Inc. v. Mat-
thews, 548 F.2d 1077, 1080-82 (1st Cir. 1977).
109. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1044.
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risprudence of decades, 110 which jurisprudence was radically
altered by ERISA and MPPAA. In Darlington, the Court held that
the later Amendment merely articulated the original congressional
construction."' Moreover, the Darlington Court considered the
contractual right involved to be de minimis." 2 MPPAA litigation,
involving tens of billions of dollars, revolves around a crucial con-
tractual relationship.1
3
Finally, Peick points to a recent district court decision uphold-
ing the mandatory award of attorney fees under MPPAA rules,
notwithstanding the award was discretionary at the time the suit
commenced." 4 That district court held it proper to apply MPPAA
retroactively. Here again, though, we are faced with a "small
repair."
This line of cases clearly does not rise to the level of constitu-
tional significance claimed in the Peick opinion. Congressional
power to redraw legislation in the regulated area has been confined
to "small repairs," where the contractual disruptions are de
minimis. "L However, Judge Getzendanner pointed also to the leg-
islative activity that surrounded ERISA and MPPAA from their
inception. The opinion held that because regulation had begun,
employers must have known that more regulation would be forth-
coming. But this sort of analysis introduces a great deal of uncer-
tainty into the pension area, making it difficult for employers to
make plans involving the far horizons that future benefits
involve."'
The legislative movement toward MPPAA began in late 1977,
a full three years prior to the law's enactment and three years after
passage of ERISA." 7 The PBGC submitted a report on the status
110. Id.
111. The Court held that, while the law may have been ambiguous, the implication had
been clear. "We do not think the Act gave mortgagors the right to rent to transients. There
is no express provision one way or the other; but the limitation seems fairly implied." 358
U.S. at 87.
112. Id. at 91.
113. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
114. Central States v. Alco Express Co., 522 F. Supp. 919 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
115. One of the first issues addressed by the Supreme Court in Allied Steel was
whether there was a "substantial impairment of a contractual relationship." 438 U.S. at 244.
116. See C. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692 (1960).
117. Peick found a growing notice in the developing MPPAA legislation. 539 F. Supp.
at 1045 n.38, 1053.
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of multiemployer plans in July, 1978;" 8 the corporation followed
with specific legislative proposals in February, 1979. The legisla-
tion was formally introduced to both houses of Congress in May,
1979. Through all the committee reports, hearings, and debates,
Judge Getzendanner found that the February, 1979 date was the
point at which employers should have gone on notice of MPPAA
pendency." 9 Any employer who entered a plan after that date
"never contributed at a time when [it] could have 'really' relied
upon [its] contract [and disclaimer] .' 1' ° Therefore, Peick con-
cluded, employers after that date "took with notice," and "acted at
their peril in the clearest sense."' 1
Peick gives scant attention to those employers already within
such plans who, due to collective bargaining agreements, found
they could not withdraw in time, or chose not to.'22 Presumably,
these employers now have no option but to face liability should
they attempt to bargain out. But of course, says Peick, by not
withdrawing, these employers will never face this liability.
2. Peick Approval of the MPPAA Retroactive Date of Effec-
tive Liability Was Based on Misplaced Principles of Law. Presi-
dent Carter signed MPPAA into law on September 26, 1980, but
the law itself made the new withdrawal liability clauses retroactive
to April 29, 1980.123 Any employer who withdrew from a multiem-
118. See PBGC STUDY, supra note 5.
119. 539 F. Supp. at 1045 n.38.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. The court does note the important distinction that the expectation of liability-free
withdrawal was "utilized" when the employer joined the plan, not at the time he attempted
to withdraw. Id. at 1053 & n.67.
On appeal, the plaintiffs in Peick emphasized the taking issue by speaking of the "prop-
erty rights" of the employers in their contractual expectations. Peick, No. 82-2081, slip op.
at 50-51 (7th Cir. Dec. 19, 1983). The Seventh Circuit dismissed this argument by holding
that "[tihe contractual rights of the employees (sic) in the case before us are in no way
analogous to the type of rights in specific property protected under the takings clause." Id.
at 53..
123. MPPAA § 108(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1461(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The retroactive
date for withdrawal liability had been set originally for Feb. 27, 1979. Senator Javits indi-
cated that the Apr. 29, 1980 date was substituted as a result of heavy political lobbying:
It should also be noted that the April 29 effective date is the product of strong
political pressures by certain withdrawing employers who were caught by the
earlier date. I realize that permitting these employers to avoid liability only in-
creases the burdens of those employers remaining with the plans in question, but
it appears necessary to accept the April 29 date in order to enact the bill before
the August 1 deadline for action.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
ployer plan after that date was subject, by later change of law, to
immediate and unlimited liability for his share of the plan's un-
funded vested liability. Plaintiffs in Peick contended that Congress
lacked the authority to legislate retroactively in a fashion that so
profoundly affected contractual agreements. The district court
held that Congress was justified on two grounds. First, it held that
the courts have sustained similar retroactive legislation in the field
of taxation, and that the justifications for doing so are applicable
to the pension field. Second, it held that there was legislative no-
tice that there would be further regulation of pension plans which
might be retroactive.
a) Judicial "approval of retroactive legislation in the tax
area. This nation has always been suspicious of retroactive legisla-
tion.124 A judicial philosophy that rests upon the premise that an
individual has the right to know the law and predicate his actions
in reliance upon the law can ill-accommodate subsequent attach-
ment of liability to acts done legally. Though the Supreme Court
declared in 1798, in Calder v. Bull, 121 that the ex post facto clause
of the federal Constitution did not apply to civil cases, neverthe-
less, J. Chase emphasized, the Court's suspicions of retroactive
laws. 2 6 J. Johnson of the Marshall Court conducted a long cam-
paign to bring retroactive legislation within the ex post facto pro-
hibition. 27 However, that goal has not been achieved, and the
126 Cong. Rec. S10101 (daily ed. July 29, 1980).
124. The Framers of the Constitution found restraint from such interference in the "so-
cial compact." See THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 351 (J. Madison) (Hamilton ed. 1880).
125. 1 U.S. (1 Dal.) 386 (1798).
126. Justice Chase wrote:
Every ex post facto law must necessarily be retrospective; but every retrospec-
tive law is not an ex post facto law: the former, only are prohibited. Every law
that takes away, or impairs, rights vested, agreeably to existing laws, is retro-
spective, and is generally unjust, and may be oppressive; and it is a good general
rule, that a law should have no retrospect....
Id. at 391 (emphasis omitted). Chase made allowances for laws which are for the "benefit of
the community," such as statutes of oblivion and pardons. Id.
127. Johnson wrote a number of dissents during his tenure focusing on this point. In
Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 415 (1829), Johnson wrote: "This Court has
had more than once to toil up hill, in order to bring within the restriction on the states to
pass laws violating the obligation of contracts, the most obvious cases to which the constitu-
tion was intended to extend its protection." Commentators have long lamented the fact that
ex post facto laws are constitutionally prohibited only in the criminal area. See, e.g., T.
Cooley, The Limits to Legislative Power in the Passage of Curative Laws, 12 CENT. L.J. 2
(1881).
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courts can count on no easy resolution to such cases. 128
Peick relied in great part on precedents from the tax field,
where the idea of retroactive legislation is well-established. 12 9 Two
cases were cited by Peick, the foremost being United States v.
Hudson,30 where Congress imposed retroactive taxation on silver
purchases. The law was there applicable to taxable events occur-
ring eight days before the bill was even introduced. 3' Such cases
can be used, Peick concluded, to show that "fair warning of a stat-
ute's terms can conceivably exist even before it is enacted.'
' 32
The Peick opinion subsequently observed that tax cases are
sui generis. 3 Unlike other areas of law, the tax field operates on
the taxable year concept, which mitigates the idea of notice. Com-
mentators have also explained the power of tax law by reference to
the paramount government interest in obtaining adequate reve-
nues: the right to tax goes to the heart of sovereignty and is not
easily defeated.134 In another recent MPPAA case, a district court
expressly rejected an attempt to extend tax principles into the
pension law area:
If he is in a regulated field, [the employer] can anticipate some clarification
and modification of the scope of regulation but cannot foresee change of a
most drastic type, especially when applied to a transaction already completed
before the new legislation is enacted. The sole exception to these principles
may well be in the field of taxation, which I regard as sui generis because of
the taxable-year concept.135
128. In weighing the constitutionality of retroactive laws under the fifth amendment
due process strictures, the courts generally weigh the public interest in the retroactive law
against the private interests that are affected by it. See C. Hochman, supra note 116. In
Adams Nursing Home of Williamstown, 548 F.2d at 1077, the court held that the recapture
of accelerated depreciation deductions by legislation (petitioner left a federal program with
accelerated depreciation deductions well in excess of what he would have received had he
chosen straight line depreciation) was not violative of due process rights; the First Circuit
qualified their holding by adding "laws that unsettle settled rights can be harsh, and they
deserve special scrutiny." Id. at 1080. See also Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948)
(renegotiation and recapture of excess profits on government contracts).
129. As early as 1935, one commentator labeled the challenges to retroactive tax legisla-
tion "dead as wager of law." F. Ballard, Retroactive Federal Taxation, 48 HARv. L. REv. 592
(1935).
130. 299 U.S. 498 (1937).
131. Silver Purchase Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1178 (repealed 1963).
132. 539 F. Supp. at 1054.
133. Id.
134. See generally Ballard, supra note 129.
135. Shelter Framing, 543 F. Supp. at 1251-52.
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Peick referenced no other authority to justify extending this
tax principle into the pension law field. But if tax law is truly sui
generis, then more justification is needed. A law which imposes lia-
bility on past events deserves more scrutiny than a law which only
operates prospectively. 138 To hold otherwise minimizes the impor-
tance of notice. Surprisingly, in view of the manifest import of the
issue, the district court in Peick gave this aspect of MPPAA rela-
tively cursory treatment.
b) Peick holds that legislative activity gave notice that pen-
sion plans would be subject to further dramatic regulation. Peick
indicated that the legislative activity surrounding enactment of
MPPAA mitigated its retroactive date of effectiveness. 137 This leg-
islative activity presumably put employers on notice that Congress
would enact MPPAA without the contingent liability aspect, and
that the law would be retroactive. A reading of the legislative
sources, however, indicates that Congress had no thought of giving
notice; rather, the congressional intent was to capture as many em-
ployers as possible in the MPPAA net.
Concern was expressed at the MPPAA hearings that employ-
ers participating in multiemployer pension plans might take notice
of the legislative proceedings and withdraw, legally, from their
plans under the old ERISA liability section. A speaker for one of
the unions supporting retroactive legislation said: "As we are sit-
ting here, discussing the enactment of the proposed bill, employers
and their counsel are discussing the feasibility of withdrawing from
multiemployer plans prior to (MPPAA) enactment .... "13 8 Senti-
ment was expressed on the Senate floor that if the statute became
effective only upon enactment, "opportunistic" employers would
withdraw while Congress was debating."3 9 In contrast to the Peick
136. See generally Hochman, supra note 116.
137. The legislative activity assumed significance only because the district court previ-
ously found that the concept of the "well regulated field" was important in this case. See
supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
138. Multiemployer Hearings, supra note 26, at 388 (testimony of D. Seifman, Counsel,
Retail Clerks Int'l Union).
139. Senator Matsunaga, speaking to the Senate, said:
The February 27, 1979 date was used to prevent any employer from withdrawing
from a plan under the lenient rules in [ERISA]. To permit the withdrawal of
these opportunistic employers without imposition of liability, would shift the
entire burden on employers remaining as plan participants. The withdrawing
employers whose workers had added to the plan's liability would avoid their
responsibility.
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opinion that the period of legislative debate extended sufficient no-
tice of further regulation, stands the expressed intent to capture
employers who might attempt to withdraw.
Peick commented: "The very care that Congress exercised in
picking MPPAA's date of effectiveness bolsters the case in favor of
the statute. '140 When the bill was first introduced on February 27,
1979, it carried that date as the date of effectiveness.141 It was only
in June, 1980, that the date of effectiveness was changed to April,
1980.142 In emphasizing the previous date of effectiveness, the
court stated that the idea of retroactivity was hardly novel by the
later date. Therefore, those employers who withdrew after that
date "acted at their peril in the clearest sense.'
43
Such analysis will result in maximum uncertainty in the pen-
sion law field. Only the inveterate reader of the Congressional Re-
cord could have been aware of the implications of the incipient
MPPAA; a businessman should not be expected to follow the pro-
gress of the many legislative bills which each year might affect
him. It is enough that he is held responsible for the laws
themselves. 44
The peril of retroactive legislation is best illustrated by one
section of MPPAA. There is an old maxim that legislatures should
not adjudicate the rights of known individuals: to do so confuses
law making and legal judgment. 45 In one section of MPPAA, how-
126 Cong. Rec. S10156 (daily ed. July 29, 1980) (emphasis added).
140. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1055-56. But see supra note 123 (remarks of Sen. Javits).
When Judge Getzendanner speaks of the care used to pick the retroactive effectiveness date,
however, she fails to mention one section of MPPAA directed toward the capture of a spe-
cific employer who would have eluded the Apr. 29, 1980 deadline. See infra note 146 and
accompanying text.
141. 539 F. Supp. at 1053.
142. Id. See also supra notes 117-21 (discussing MPPAA's evolving calendar).
143. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1045 n.48.
144. In holding the retroactive portion of MPPAA unconstitutional and deprecating the
argument that employers should have anticipated MPPAA, one court has said:
Forecasting congressional action (or lack of action) is akin to forecasting the
weather or the stock market: There are simply too many unpredictable variables
involved. To adopt the view ... would be to impose a burden upon [a preenact-
ment withdrawing employer] to be a clairvoyant - to predict that Congress
would pass legislation four months hence.
Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co. v. Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco Workers Int'l Union, 566 F.
Supp. 32, 35-36 (W.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, No. 83-7328 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1984).
145. "It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society; the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to
be the duty of other departments." Fletcher v. Peck, 11 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136, as cited in
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ever, Congress carefully crafted an exception to the general date of
effective liability so that one specific employer was given his own
unique withdrawal liability date.14 This one employer was effec-
tively tried and judged in Senate debates of which he may, or may
not, have been aware. Such abuses are facilitated when retroactive
laws are allowed.
III. LEGAL AVENUES FOR EMPLOYER RESTRAINT OF PLAN TRUSTEE
ACTIONS WHICH EXPAND A PLAN'S UNFUNDED VESTED LIABILITY
Employer liability for pension plan performance traditionally
stopped at the point of contribution. 47 As a result of ERISA, each
employer in a multiemployer pension plan is now liable for a por-
tion of the unfunded vested liability, which is controlled, in part,
by employer-appointed trustees. The liability is principally a func-
tion of plan asset performance in the marketplace and trustee deci-
sions on benefit levels. It is inevitable that employers will work to
control both areas now that their ledgers must carry a portion of
the plan's liability.148
United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 446 (1965). Trial by legislature must be avoided.
"Under our Constitution, Congress possesses full legislative authority, but the task of adju-
dication must be left to other tribunals." Brown, 381 U.S. at 461.
146. MPPAA § 108(c)(4), imposed an effective date of May 3,1979, on any "substantial
employer covering employees in the seagoing industry (as so determined) in connection with
ports on the West Coast of the United States, but does not include an employer who with-
drew from a plan because of a change in the collective bargaining representitive." Senator
Matunaga sponsored this exception because of the "equities" of a specific situation: one
employer had withdrawn from a multiemployer pension plan and two had remained (the
latter assumed the unfunded vested liability left behind by the former). To delete this
amendment, said Sen. Matsunaga, "would favor the culprits in this case, the companies who
decided to withdraw from all responsibility that had accumulated in the past." 126 Cong.
Rec. S10158 (daily ed. July 29, 1980). Senator Pressler argued against the amendment:
It is true the company withdrew on that date. But by carefully crafting the pro-
vision, it is the only company to which liability attaches. The 200 other compa-
nies which also withdrew are not affected.. . . Another seagoing firm which also
withdrew was carefully not included.. . . So we are picking out one company in
a piece of retroactive legislation and going back. That is a matter of equity that
is of concern to me.
Id. at S10157. The amendment passed, and thus one employer (who was not given a hear-
ing) was held liable on the Senate floor. Over two hundred other employers withdrew during
the same period (May 3, 1979 - Apr. 29, 1980) without incurring MPPAA withdrawal liabil-
ity. Id.
147. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
148. See passim W. Jett, The Path to Destruction of Taft-Hartley Trusts, 28 LAB. L.J.
403 (1977) (the natural reaction of employers who have fallen into open-ended liability will
be to seek to control the actions of plan trustees).
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Two avenues appear to offer employers the ability to control
the discretion of trustees in their administration of the pension
plan. First, the collective bargaining agreement, which establishes
the pension plan, can be crafted to limit trustee discretion on key
matters. Second, in the absence of collective bargaining restraints,
employers may seek judicial remedies under rules of equity.
A. Employers Can Define and Limit 'Plan Trustee Discretion
Within the Collective Bargaining Agreement
ERISA requires the plan trustee to "discharge his duties...
solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. 149 Peick
suggested that trustee duties can be limited in the collective bar-
gaining agreement:
At a subsequent round of collective bargaining, employers can insist that re-
strictions upon trustee behavior be written into the actual contract and decla-
ration of trust establishing their plan. They can bargain for language forbid-
ding future benefit improvements which increase the plan's unfunded vested
liability by more than a set amount or percentage. If these demands are ac-
cepted, the employers will clearly regain substantial control over their level of
exposure.160
There had been speculation that this type of approach would not
be possible. 151 In United Mine Workers v. Robinson,"52 the Su-
preme Court considered a case where a small group of miners were
denied pension plan eligibility by the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Court ruled that the trustees were respon-
sible to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement.
The petitioner trustees were not given "full authority" to determine eligibil-
ity requirements and benefit level, for these were fixed by the 1974 collective
149. ERISA § 404(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
150. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1049 (citation omitted). Earlier, the decision suggests that
employer trustees may find that employer and plan goals are similar where withdrawal lia-
bility is involved: If actions toward these goals "are also taken in the best interests of the
plan, they should be taken." Id. at 1048. But there is the catch: the action must always be in
the best interests of the plan under ERISA guidelines, and the chances that such actions
will coincide with employer interests are problematic to say the least. The idea conjures up
the dangerous image of the trustee's two hats, abhorrent to the common law definition of
the good fiduciary. See also supra note 15 (Taft-Hartley language).
151. See W. Jett, supra note 148, at 411. The Ninth Circuit ruled in Toensing v.
Brown, 528 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1975), that trustees are not bound by instructions received
from the collective bargaining parties. The court tfiere emphasized the need for trustee "in-
dependent judgment." Id. at 72.
152. 455 U.S. 562 (1982).
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bargaining agreement. By the terms of the trust created by the agreement,
the trustees are obligated to enforce these determinations unless modification
is required to comply with applicable federal law.
153
Of course, eligibility requirements and benefit levels are only one
side of the unfunded vested liability. Plan asset performance in the
marketplace affects the liability as well. Now that it is clear that
the collective bargaining agreement can be written in ways that re-
strain trustee discretion, control over plan investments may be
available to employers.
Collective bargaining plan limitations, as suggested by Peick,
will most likely be the recourse of employers seeking to limit their
liability exposure.
B. Employers Can Seek to Review Plan Trustee Decision Under
Rules of Equity
In the absence of collective bargaining agreement limitations
on trustee discretion, employers may seek present relief from mul-
tiemployer plan trustees who act to expand the unfunded vested
liability as a result of the district court holding in Borden v.
United Dairy Workers Pension Program.15 4 Plaintiff there ob-
tained an injunction to preserve the status quo of a plan enjoying
fully funded status;"5 the injunction was to endure until the com-
pany could bargain with the union over the plan benefit factor.15 6
The court said in Borden:
This court is persuaded that the imposition of liability under the ERISA
amendments does operate to impose on Borden unbargained for obligations,
and that this change in the law was not one which could have been foreseen
by the parties when entering into the collective bargaining agreements. Such
obligation should not be imposed on a contracting party absent a meeting of
the minds.
157
153. Id. at 573-74. Absent such directions, the trustee will be held to a high, fiduciary
standard under ERISA, notwithstanding statutory reference to the trustee as a "representa-
tive." See supra note 15 and accompanying text; see also NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S.
322, 331-32 (1981) ("the duty of the management-appointed trustee... is directly antitheti-
cal to that of an agent of the appointing party").
154. 517 F. Supp. 1162 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
155. Id. at 1164. The PBGC recently announced that employers withdrawing from a
fully funded plan cannot be assessed liability for the decrease in the fund's overfunding.
PEN. REP. (BNA), Dec. 6, 1982, at 1722.
156. 517 F. Supp. at 1166.
157. Id. Peick disagreed with the Borden analysis. Since this was a "well-regulated
field," the new regulations were foreseeable. Therefore, no equitable argument existed to
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However, two factors in Borden limit its value as precedent.
First, Borden, the only plaintiff in the action, contributed approxi-
mately 80% of the contributions to the plan; therefore, its foresee-
able liability for the trustee's decision to expand benefits was a sig-
nificant percentage of the plan's liability. Second, the action arose
at an early point in ERISA litigation. Now that it has been seen
that the collective bargaining agreement can be drawn to limit
trustee discretion (as observed in Borden), the suitability of equi-
table relief will diminish.
CONCLUSION
ERISA and MPPAA, enacted to regulate private pension
plans, have disrupted employer contractual expectations and im-
posed harsh penalties where none existed before. The legislation
has defeated employer disclaimers of plan liabilities upon which
employers had relied in deciding to enter these plans. Further-
more, the legislation, which essentially grants unbargained for ad-
ditional compensation to employees in private pension plans, was
not directed toward a valid public purpose as indicated by prece-
dential Supreme Court opinions. Nor was the legislation necessary
in the way that similar, previously upheld legislation was. Finally,
MPPAA imposition of a retroactive date of withdrawal liability
was an unreasonable and inappropriate action which cannot be jus-
tified by traditional legal analysis.
Peick recognized the harsh implications of the new law.
"Plaintiffs have convinced me that withdrawal liability can be
harsh and onerous in certain circumstances." 158 The court also rec-
ognized that employer enthusiasm for multiemployer plans has
waned in the wake of MPPAA.
159
Authorities in the pension field are advising clients not to join
multiemployer plans, and if already in one, to assert control over
plan management and develop strategies to minimize liability.'1 0
Should the courts fail to ameliorate the harsh impact of MPPAA
mitigate MPPAA's effects. 539 F. Supp. at 1049 n.50.
158. Peick, 539 F. Supp. at 1052.
159. Id. at 1052 n.62.
160. Cummings & Kershaw, Withdrawal Liability Under the Multiemployer Pension
Plan Amendment Act of 1980, 40 INST. ON FED. TAX'N 12-1, 12-2 (ERISA Supp. 1982); see
also Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1982, at 40, col. 1 (unions having difficulty bringing new employers
into the funds).
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on many employers, a legislative reappraisal of the entire pension
regulatory system will be necessary.
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